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Hooi: Qualified Immunitity: When is a Loss Ultimately a Win?

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: WHEN IS A LOSS ULTIMATELY
A WIN?
Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007)
Michael J. Hooi*
A Georgia sheriff’s deputy clocked Victor Harris driving seventy-three
miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone.1 After Harris ignored the
deputy’s signal to pull over for speeding, the deputy began a high-speed
chase and radioed dispatch for backup. Deputy Timothy Scott heard the
broadcast and became Harris’s lead pursuer.2 Scott ended the chase by
striking his cruiser’s push bumper against the back of Harris’s car, causing
Harris’s car to fall down an embankment and crash, rendering Harris a
quadriplegic.3
Harris filed suit for monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,4
* J.D., May 2008, University of Florida Levin College of Law. For my family, whose
loving support has given me the confidence to “[t]est all things [and to] hold fast what is good.” 1
Thess. 5:21. I’d like to thank The Honorable Elizabeth A. Kovachevich; Sheila F. McNeill, Esq.;
N. Sherrill Newton, Esq.; Professor Sharon E. Rush; The Honorable Charles R. Wilson; and the
members and staff of the Florida Law Review. This Comment expresses my own views, not
necessarily those of the persons who have either shared their penetrating insights with me or
participated in the publication process.
1. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (2007).
2. Id. at 1773.
3. Id. Scott and Harris encountered one another in a shopping center parking lot before
Harris reentered the highway and continued leading the officers on the high-speed chase. Id. Harris
“was nearly boxed in” by Scott’s and other officers’ vehicles, but he managed to escape by
“colliding with Scott’s police car, exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again down a twolane highway.” Id. Scott later radioed his supervisor for permission to perform the “Precision
Intervention Technique” maneuver, which causes a fleeing vehicle to spin and stop. Id. He
allegedly had his supervisor’s permission to “take [Harris] out.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Coweta
County, 433 F.3d 807, 811 (11th Cir. 2005)). Scott claimed that he decided against performing the
maneuver after all because he thought it might be unsafe, given the high speeds at which the cars
were moving. Id. at 1773 n.1. None of these facts, however, affected the outcome of the case. Id.
As the Supreme Court noted, “[i]t is irrelevant to [the] analysis whether Scott had permission to
take the precise actions he took,” id., because Scott acted under color of state law. See Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (holding that a state officer qua state officer acts under color of
state law even if his actions are not taken pursuant to any official state policy).
4. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773. The statute reads:
Every person who, under color of [law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
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alleging, among other things, that Scott violated the Fourth Amendment
by using excessive force during the chase.5 Scott entered into the record a
video recording of the car chase to support his claim that Harris’s reckless
driving posed a substantial threat of imminent physical harm to others.6
Scott moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which
the district court denied.7 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on interlocutory
appeal,8 and Scott petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme
Court granted.9 The Court reviewed the video recording de novo and found
that the recording “utterly discredited” Harris’s version of the facts
adopted by both the district and circuit courts.10 The Supreme Court
accordingly reversed the Eleventh Circuit and HELD that Scott acted
reasonably when he ended the car chase, that he did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, and that he was entitled to qualified immunity.11
When a person alleges that a police officer violated that person’s rights
and sues for monetary damages, the officer may assert immunity as an
affirmative defense.12 The officer may be entitled to absolute immunity or
qualified immunity, depending on the governmental function he performed
when the alleged violation occurred.13 Usually, a police officer is entitled
to absolute immunity only when he is testifying in court as a witness.14
Since absolute immunity defenses tend to apply categorically, they
generally can be resolved on motions to dismiss.15
However, most governmental functions performed by police officers
afford them only qualified immunity.16 The qualified immunity doctrine
tries to balance the public policy that wrongfully injured plaintiffs should

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 creates a cause of action against a person acting under color
of state law who violates federal constitutional or statutory laws. Id. The statute does not create
federal court jurisdiction. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002); Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1980).
5. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773.
6. Id. at 1775–76. Harris did not allege that the videotape was doctored, id. at 1775, and the
Eleventh Circuit examined the facts in the light most favorable to Harris, as the law required. Id.
at 1774–75 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369
U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)).
7. Id. at 1773.
8. Id. A district court’s denial of qualified immunity can be immediately appealed. Id. at
1773 n.2 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–27 (1985)).
9. Id. at 1774.
10. Id. at 1775–76.
11. Id. at 1779.
12. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 509–10, 514 (4th ed. 2003).
13. Id. at 512.
14. Id. at 526–27.
15. LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 426 (2d ed. 2003) (citing Alan K. Chen, The
Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 261, 262 (1995)).
16. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 528–29.
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be compensated and the public policy that officers should not be
constantly subject to liability for their “judgment calls made in a legally
uncertain environment.”17 Qualified immunity defenses, accordingly, tend
to be more fact-sensitive than absolute immunity defenses.18
The Supreme Court established the groundwork for the current
standard for qualified immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.19 The respondent
filed suit after losing his job at the Air Force,20 alleging that the petitioners
violated his federal legal rights by conspiring to discharge him for
exposing the Air Force’s cost overruns.21 Before Harlow, the respondent
could have recovered monetary damages if he could prove that the
petitioners acted with malice.22 The Harlow Court observed, however, that
plaintiffs could too easily allege malice and disrupt governmental
operations,23 hoping to find evidence during discovery to support their
allegations.24 The Court responded by establishing a solely objective
standard to determine whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity.25
Under Harlow, officers “generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”26

17. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 185 (1995) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 806 (1982)).
18. YACKLE, supra note 15, at 432.
19. 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982).
20. Id. at 803. It is irrelevant for the purposes of defining the qualified immunity doctrine that
Harlow was not filed in federal district court as a § 1983 action. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12,
at 514. Because the defendants in Harlow were federal, not state, officials, their actions were not
subject to suit pursuant to § 1983. However, the Supreme Court provided plaintiffs a cause of action
against federal officers for alleged violations of federal law in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
21. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 803 & n.2.
22. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
23. Discovery can be costly and time-consuming for the officers, and trial courts would
generally have difficulty granting summary judgment on the issue of malice because the issue
presents a question of fact that normally would be resolved at trial. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816–17.
Moreover, the cost of law enforcement officers as defendants spills over to society as a whole.
Public safety can be compromised if officers are over-deterred from performing their duties for fear
of legal action against them. Id. at 814 (noting that “society as a whole” will bear the “expenses of
litigation” given the “diversion of official energy from pressing public issues”).
24. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 531.
25. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–18.
26. Id. at 818. It is interesting, perhaps ironic, that the test for qualified immunity is now
solely objective. Harlow essentially overturned Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975), in
which the Supreme Court noted that the test for whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity
included both objective and subjective elements. Under Wood, an official was not entitled to
qualified immunity if “he knew or reasonably should have known that the action [at issue] . . .
would violate . . . constitutional rights . . . or if he took the action with the malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.” Id. at 322. Justice Powell’s dissent in

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 7

Florida Law Review

982

[V ol. 60

The Harlow Court did not explain what it means for the law to be
“clearly established.”27 However, through further development of the
qualified immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court has stated that a right can
be clearly established even if there is no prior case law on point.28 But,
unless the officer obviously violates a right,29 the plaintiff often will have
to show that the right was clearly established in light of precedent.30
The Court’s precedent showed that the Fourth Amendment right
against “the use of deadly force against nonviolent suspects” was clearly
established at the time Harris led the deputies on the car chase.31 In
Tennessee v. Garner,32 Memphis police officers were dispatched to
respond to a “prowler inside call.”33 One of the officers saw the fleeing
suspect approach a chain-link fence.34 The officer was “reasonably sure”
that the suspect was unarmed.35 The officer then cried “police, halt” and
approached the suspect, but the suspect tried to climb the fence.36 The
officer was convinced that if the suspect made it over the fence, the
suspect would not be captured.37 The officer shot the suspect in the back
of the head and killed him.38 In light of these facts, the Garner Court held
that
deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed
suspected felon . . . may not be used unless it is necessary to

Wood criticized the objective component of the test because it is difficult to define the law in such
a way that a reasonable officer would know that the conduct at issue violated clearly established
rights. See id. at 329 (Powell, J., dissenting).
27. The Honorable Charles R. Wilson, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity
Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 453 (2000). There is little agreement among the
federal circuit courts about what the term “clearly established” means. Id. at 447. Some circuits
interpret the term broadly, while others, including the Eleventh Circuit, are “reluctant to find that
the law is ‘clearly established’ for qualified immunity purposes unless the right which the
government actor allegedly violated has been clearly identified and protected in an earlier, factually
similar context.” Id. at 448.
28. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740–41 (2002); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.
259, 270–71 (1997).
29. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 271 (recognizing that “a general constitutional rule . . . may apply
with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question” even when the challenged conduct has not
yet been held unlawful).
30. See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam).
31. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1985).
32. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id.
38. Garner, 471 U.S. at 4.
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prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or
serious physical injury to the officer or others.39
Because Fourth Amendment cases tend to be fact-sensitive,40
determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity sometimes
appears so intertwined with the question whether the officer violated the
law that the two questions should be treated as one.41 The Supreme Court
addressed that possibility in Saucier v. Katz.42 The petitioner, a military
police officer, was warned by his supervisors to expect protests during a
celebration at which then-Vice President Al Gore was scheduled to
speak.43 When Gore began speaking from behind a waist-high fence, the
respondent approached the fence and revealed a protest banner that he had
with him.44 As the respondent tried to post the banner, the petitioner and
another officer45 grabbed the respondent from behind, seized the banner,
and rushed him out.46 “Each officer had one of respondent’s arms, halfwalking, half-dragging him, with his feet barely touching the ground.”47
The officers then allegedly shoved the respondent into a military van,
causing him to fall to the floor of the van where he caught himself just in
time to avoid any injury.48 They took him to a military police station,
briefly detained him, and eventually released him.49

39. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
40. See DANIEL E. HALL, CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 372 (4th ed. 2003) (asserting that
“[s]earch and seizure problems can be complex” because “[that] area of law is highly
fact-sensitive”). Professor Steinberg has argued that “the vast preponderance of the historical
evidence suggests that the framers adopted the Fourth Amendment solely to proscribe unlawful
physical intrusions into houses.” David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1076 (2004) (emphasis added). But see Lisa A.
Mattern, Comment, Constitutional Law: Knock-and-Announce Violations and the Purposeful
Enforcement of the Exclusionary Rule, 59 FLA. L. REV. 465, 465–66 (2007) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment does not specify how the courts should protect the right against unreasonable seizures
and discussing the Fourth Amendment’s application in police evidence-gathering practices).
41. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197 (2001).
42. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
43. Id. at 197–98.
44. Id. at 198. The respondent was not protesting Gore’s attendance at the celebration. Id. at
197. Instead, he sought to demonstrate his concern that a military hospital would be used to conduct
experiments on animals. Id.
45. Id. at 198. The other officer was not a party to the suit. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The respondent was also allegedly
wearing a knee-high leg brace, but the petitioner testified that he did not recall noticing it when he
and the other officer rushed the respondent out. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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The respondent alleged that the petitioner violated the Fourth
Amendment by using excessive force during the arrest.50 The petitioner
claimed that he was entitled to qualified immunity, which the district court
denied.51 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the questions
“whether the law governing the official’s conduct was clearly established”
and whether “a reasonable officer could have believed . . . that his conduct
was lawful”52 were identical because both questions “concern the objective
reasonableness of the officer’s conduct in light of the circumstances the
officer faced on the scene.”53
The Supreme Court disagreed and established a two-step “fixed orderof-battle rule”54 for the federal courts to follow in qualified immunity
cases.55 The first step is to determine “whether a constitutional right would
have been violated [by the officer] on the facts alleged.”56 If not, then the
officer is entitled to qualified immunity.57 But if so, then “the next,
sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established” when
the alleged violation occurred.58 Unless the right was clearly established,
the court will grant qualified immunity.59 The Saucier Court believed that
the legal standards for officer conduct would be more clearly developed
through case law with the fixed order of battle than without it.60
While acknowledging that Harris’s alleged facts were not completely
inaccurate, the Scott Court found that the district and circuit courts
misunderstood the legal relevance of those facts.61 Harris’s alleged facts
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 198–99.
Id. at 199. Like Harlow, Saucier was a Bivens action. Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 200.
See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring).
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 197, 200–01.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201. (Note: These are citations to Saucier.)
Id.
See id. at 201–02.
Id. at 201. The Court stated:
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated on the
premises alleged, a court might find it necessary to set forth principles which will
become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly established. This is the
process for the law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our
insisting upon turning to the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right as
the first inquiry. The law might be deprived of this explanation were a court
simply to skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly established that an
officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case.

Id.
61. See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 n.7 (2007) (recognizing that not “every factual
statement made by the Court of Appeals [was] inaccurate”).
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emphasized particular moments during the chase.62 Although “Harris
remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, . . .
typically used his indicators for turns,” and “did not run any motorists off
the road,”63 the videotape showed that he was also driving dangerously fast
on a two-lane highway, swerving around traffic, and running through red
lights.64 Just because the officers and bystanders may not have been in
actual imminent danger at particular moments did not preclude Scott’s
reasonable belief, based on the totality of the circumstances, that Harris’s
reckless driving posed a substantial threat of imminent physical harm.65
The Court accordingly distinguished Scott from Garner.66 Unlike the
suspect in Garner, who did not pose a significant threat of serious injury
to others,67 Harris endangered the officers and bystanders by speeding in
his car.68 Thus, the Court rejected the suggestion that Garner could have
put the deputy on fair notice that bumping Harris’s car, even though doing
so involved deadly force,69 violated the Fourth Amendment.70
The Scott Court also assessed the reasonableness of Scott’s actions.71
It found that Scott’s use of deadly force was collateral to the
reasonableness of his actions.72 The Court “‘balance[d] the nature and
quality of the intrusion [into Harris’s] Fourth Amendment interests against
the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the

62. See Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 815–16 & n.11 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub
nom. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
63. Id. at 815–16.
64. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775.
65. See id. at 1775–79.
66. Id. at 1777.
67. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
68. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1777. The Court further found that Harris’s allegations that there were
no motorists or pedestrians in the way at the instant Scott used the push bumper cut against Harris’s
case. See id. at 1775. The absence of motorists or pedestrians at that moment suggested that “Scott
waited for the road to be clear before executing his maneuver.” Id. at 1776 n.7.
69. Scott was on notice that, under prior case law, his police car, like a gun, can be a deadly
weapon. See United States v. Gualdado, 794 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986).
70. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1777–78. Reiterating the Eleventh Circuit’s own precedent, the Scott
Court asserted that “‘Garner had nothing to do with one car striking another or even with car chases
in general . . . . A police car’s bumping a fleeing car is, in fact, not much like a policeman’s
shooting a gun so as to hit a person.’” Id. at 1777 (alteration in original) (quoting Adams v. St.
Lucie County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 962 F.2d 1563, 1577 (11th Cir. 1992) (Edmondson, J., dissenting),
reh’g granted and vacated, 998 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc). The Scott Court added, “Nor
is the threat posed by the flight on foot of an unarmed suspect even remotely comparable to the
extreme danger to human life posed by [a fleeing driver speeding on a public highway].” Id.
(emphasis added).
71. “Whether or not Scott’s actions constituted application of ‘deadly force,’ all that matters
is whether Scott’s actions were reasonable.” Id. at 1778.
72. Id.
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intrusion’” by assessing Scott’s and Harris’s relative culpability.73 Scott
claimed that he tried to ensure public safety by bumping Harris off the
road.74 Yet, in so doing, he posed a substantial risk of bodily harm to
Harris.75
On the other hand, Harris’s reckless driving imminently threatened the
lives of the officers in the chase and any bystanders who might have been
around.76 By ignoring the flashing lights and police sirens, Harris caused
the high-speed chase to occur.77 The Court concluded that Scott acted
reasonably under the circumstances.78 In so concluding, the Court found,
in answer to the first Saucier inquiry, that the facts alleged by Harris failed
to establish that Scott violated his constitutional rights. The Court also
announced a new constitutional rule: “A police officer’s attempt to
terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of
innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when
it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” By finding
no constitutional violation, the Court did not need proceed to the second
Saucier inquiry.
Yet, by explaining that Garner did not clearly establish a right that
controlled the outcome in Scott,79 the Court showed that the two Saucier
inquiries can overlap. The Scott Court, accordingly, had the opportunity
to reconsider Saucier’s fixed order of battle.80 The Court could have used
Scott as precedent to allow the lower federal courts to conduct the Saucier
inquiries in the order that they find appropriate under the circumstances of
the individual cases before them.81 The Scott Court could have done that
by not announcing the new rule.82 But by announcing the new rule, the
Scott Court further developed individual rights.
To be sure, if the Court had not announced the rule, it would arguably
have disposed of Scott more efficiently.83 The Scott Court had a sufficient
legal basis to reverse the Eleventh Circuit by distinguishing Scott from
Garner and concluding that there was no clearly established law to put

73. Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1778 (“Although there is no obvious way to quantify the risks on either side, it is
clear from the videotape that [Harris] posed an actual and imminent threat . . . .”).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1778–79.
79. See supra note 70.
80. See id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that in an amicus brief, twenty-eight states
had asked the Scott Court to reconsider Saucier’s fixed order of battle).
81. Id.
82. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
83. See Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Scott on fair notice that he used excessive force on Harris.84 Alternatively,
the Supreme Court could have reversed the Eleventh Circuit and granted
Scott qualified immunity even if Scott conceded that he used excessive
force and violated the Fourth Amendment.85 It would not have mattered in
either situation how the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutional
question.86 Scott would have been entitled to qualified immunity under
either line of analysis.87 In sum, the rule can be criticized as being both
inefficient and unnecessary.
But these criticisms are misplaced. By articulating the rule, the Scott
Court struck a balance between the often-competing values of maintaining
the judicial role of developing individual rights, and judicial efficiency.88
Although the rule does not appear on its face to identify any limits on what
a police officer may do to stop a fleeing driver,89 the Scott Court,
paradoxically, developed individual rights by attempting to clarify their
scope vis-à-vis the use of force by police officers.90
The Scott rule informs not only police officers, who often have to make
split-second decisions while performing their discretionary duties,91 but
also potential plaintiffs who may consider filing excessive-force claims in
the federal courts.92 With the Scott rule, rather than without it, potential

84. See id.
85. See The Honorable Pierre N. Leval, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1277–78
(2006) (discussing the unnecessary theoretical constitutional inquiry after good faith immunity is
established); see also Benjamin J. Robinson, Comment, Constitutional Law: Suppressing the
Exclusionary Rule, 59 FLA. L. REV. 475, 484 (2007) (suggesting that even a threat of a suit for
monetary damages under § 1983 may not be enough to deter unconstitutional police misconduct).
86. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Leval, supra note 85,
at 1277–78.
87. See Leval, supra note 85, at 1277–78.
88. See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the Law Is: How Certain Legal
Doctrines Impede the Development of Constitutional Law and What Courts Can Do About It, FED.
CTS. L. REV., May 2007, at 1, 8, at http://www.fclr.org/docs/2007fedctslrev1.pdf (on file with the
Florida Law Review).
89. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774, 1779. Professor Blum has criticized the rule as being both too
broad and too narrow. See Karen M. Blum, Scott v. Harris: Death Knell for Deadly Force Policies
and Garner Jury Instructions?, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 45, 62 (2007). To the extent that it is a broad,
“per se” rule, it may foreclose successful constitutional challenges even to irresponsible, perhaps
reckless, police conduct. Id. To the extent that the rule is narrow and limited to the facts of Scott,
it fails to clearly establish the law as to whether police conduct under even slightly different
circumstances would be excessive. Id.
90. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1779.
91. YACKLE, supra note 15, at 552.
92. See generally Wilson, supra note 27, at 472–75 (discussing the dilemma of allowing
public officials to do their jobs, while permitting plaintiffs to pursue worthy claims of constitutional
violations). Maintaining uncertainty by avoiding a difficult legal question may also be
“incompatible with prevailing notions of the judicial role, in which courts are obligated to resolve
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plaintiffs can better assess their chances of success in overcoming
summary judgment based on qualified immunity and in proceeding on the
merits of their claims. The rule promotes judicial efficiency to the extent
that it may discourage potential plaintiffs from filing suit when it appears
unlikely that they can present excessive-force cases with genuine issues of
material fact.93
This is not to say that the Scott rule will prevent future plaintiffs in
situations similar to Harris’s from recovering monetary damages. Just
because excessive-force cases can be distinguished based on the facts they
present94 does not mean that the Scott rule has no purpose. To the extent
that it upholds Saucier, the Scott rule maintains the federal courts’ role in
developing individual rights in cases that do not proceed to trial.95 The rule
reflects the Scott Court’s apparent recognition that the fixed order of battle
helps maintain a meaningful difference between absolute and qualified
immunity.96
By maintaining that difference, Scott helps give plaintiffs in
excessive-force cases their day in court. Unlike an absolute immunity case,
a qualified immunity case usually cannot be resolved on a fact-insensitive
motion to dismiss.97 A qualified immunity case is instead typically
resolved after the defendant officer moves for summary judgment.98 In
contrast to resolving a motion to dismiss, resolving a motion for summary
judgment requires a court to take account of the facts in the record.99 By
declining to relax the order of the Saucier inquiries,100 the Scott Court has
the matters brought before them regardless of the consequences of doing so.” Chad M. Oldfather,
Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743,
749–50 (2006). Professor Oldfather also raises the possibility that such an understanding of the
judicial role is misguided. Id. at 750; see also Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive
Virtues and Casual Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 716, 732
(2001) (suggesting that the federal circuit courts do not generally have the authority to avoid
adjudicating claims before them).
93. See, e.g., Neal v. City of Bradenton, No. 8:05-cv-00790-T-17-TBM, 2006 WL 1804585,
at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. June 27, 2006) (granting the defendant police officer’s motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity after finding that the § 1983 plaintiff presented an “uneven
recollection of the facts” and would have difficulty showing that genuine issues of material fact
existed for trial).
94. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
39 (1997) (noting that judges can reach desired results by distinguishing precedent cases).
95. See Blum, supra note 89, at 76–77, and David Kessler, Comment, Justices in the Jury
Box: Video Evidence and Summary Judgment in Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007), 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423, 430–35 (2008), for arguments supporting the district and circuit courts’
position that Harris’s claims should have gone to trial.
96. But see infra note 102.
97. YACKLE, supra note 15, at 432.
98. Id.
99. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) and FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
100. See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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assured future plaintiffs in excessive-force cases that they will have the
opportunity to present their allegations at summary judgment and possibly
recover monetary damages from individual officers, without fear that their
allegations will be immediately dismissed as if the officers were entitled
to absolute immunity.101
The Scott rule is therefore not the inefficient and unnecessary rule that
it may appear at first to be. The rule is fundamentally an extension of
precedent. And although it seems counterintuitive, the Scott Court traveled
the path of least resistance by ruling on a constitutional question when that
ruling might have been unnecessary to resolve the case.102 In so doing, the
Court avoided the more challenging tasks of deciding whether to
reconsider Saucier and of determining a new standard of review for
qualified immunity cases. Instead, the Court ensured that future plaintiffs
in excessive-force cases will continue to have their day in court. Thus,
while Scott was a loss for the individual plaintiff Harris, it was ultimately
a win for the federal courts’ role in developing individual rights.

101. See YACKLE, supra note 15, at 432-33.
102. See Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774 n.4 (“We need not address the wisdom of Saucier in this
case, however, because the constitutional question with which we are presented is . . . easily
decided. Deciding that question first is thus the ‘better approach,’ . . . regardless of whether it is
required.”) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998)). See also
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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